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I am sure that I am not alone in wondering whether one can
be a feminist and, consistent with that perspective, use the courts
for litigation. Consequently, I am surprised to find this question
often ignored in the many articles in the area of feminist juris-
prudence. Often we are told the correct feminist position on a
particular issue, but rarely are we told whether the way to achieve
that position is through legal argumentation and, if legal argu-
mentation is appropriate, how to make legal arguments from a
feminist perspective.' In this Article, I want to begin to address
these issues. Specifically, I would like to share my thoughts on
the subject of feminism and constitutional litigation in the context
of the abortion debate.
I will pose two questions: first, have feminists been true to
their perspective in using the courts to resolve the abortion issue,
and, second, when they have turned to the courts, have they
spoken in a feminist voice? Many feminists in the United States
* Professor of Law, Tulane University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of To-
ronto (spring 1990). I would like to thank Kathy Austin at the Tulane Law Library and
Rebecca Cook, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Faculty of Medicine, University
of Toronto, for helping me to locate the briefs in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); the University of Toronto Law School for allowing me to use its
facilities as a visiting scholar; and Patrick Macklem, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto Law School, for helping me to become more familiar with the
Canadian scholarship that I cite in this Article.
' To the extent that scholars do discuss the appropriateness of litigation, they do so in
order to compare litigation with alternative dispute resolution. See, e.g., Richard Delgado,
Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee, & David Hubbert, Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
1359 (1985) [hereinafter Delgado]; Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57
(1984); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). In this Article, I am comparing litigation
to legislative politics rather than to another form of adjudicatory dispute resolution.
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might find this question to be a nonquestion. 2 However, if asked,
their responses probably would include the following: (1) that
feminists had no real choice but to turn to the courts for resolution
of the abortion issue, (2) that they have spoken to the courts in
an authentically feminist voice by making "pro-choice" legal ar-
guments, (3) that the activist judgment they obtained in Jane Roe
v. Henry Wade3 was a real victory because it entrenched the pro-
choice position in our constitutional discourse for seventeen
years, and (4) that no matter what retrenchment occurs regarding
the Roe decision, those seventeen years constituted an enormous
victory for women, which can be measured by the number of
women's lives that were saved by avoiding the need to have
illegal abortions.
4
Some feminists 5 and leftist scholars 6 in Canada do not share
American feminists' satisfaction with Roe and, more generally,
2 For discussion of the concept of a "nonquestion," see MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD
THE FATHER (1973). A "nonquestion" is a question that we do not even think to ask
because the process of socialization makes the question itself unthinkable. Because of
our aggressive, adversarial legal culture, many feminists have accepted the tools of the
adversarial system without questioning whether they are, in fact, feminist tools. Thus,
the question of whether activist litigation strategies are feminist has been a "nonquestion."
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 This speculation is based on responses to my delivery of versions of this Article at
various conferences and faculty workshops as well as classes in feminist jurisprudence
at Tulane Law School and the University of Toronto Law School.
- See, e.g., Judy Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction: The Possibilities of and the
Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles, 25 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 485 (1987) [hereinafter Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction]; Judy Fudge, The
Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and
Sexual Violence in Canada, 17 INT'L. J. Soc. OF LAW. 445 (1989); Kathleen A. Lahey,
Feminist Theories of (In)Equality, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY 71 (Sheilah
L. Martin & Kathleen E. Mahoney eds. 1987).
Of course, the Canadian-feminist movement is not monolithic. Many Canadian feminists
support an activist role for the courts and, in fact, filed a brief with the United States
Supreme Court in Webster arguing that the Court should not overrule Roe. See Brief of
Canadian Women's Organizations, Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, William Webs-
ter v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief
of Canadian Women's Organizations].
6 See, e.g., MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF
POLITICS IN CANADA (1989); Allan C. Hutchinson, Alien Thoughts: A Comment on
Constitutional Scholarship, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 701 (1985). The pro-democracy perspec-
tive is embraced by Canadian constitutional theorists of a wide variety of political per-
spectives, not simply the critical left or Marxist perspective. See, e.g., PATRICK MONA-
HAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER, FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA (1987) (a pro-democracy argument which is not as leftist as others in
political orientation); RONALD I. CHEFFINS & PATRICIA A. JOHNSON, THE REVISED
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION: POLITICS As LAW (1986) (a British-oriented pro-democracy
argument which is critical of law as politics).
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American feminists' confidence in the ability of feminists to con-
vince the courts to resolve social and political questions through
constitutional litigation. Some Canadian feminists view consti-
tutional litigation with skepticism for several reasons. First, they
view the Canadian legislative branch as more progressive than
the judicial branch at this time in Canadian history.7 Second, they
suggest that constitutional argumentation necessarily co-opts rad-
ical arguments by turning them into liberal arguments.8 Finally,
they question whether we want to turn to authoritarian institu-
tions such as courts to resolve political questions. 9
The Canadian critique of constitutional litigation is relevant to
constitutional litigation in the United States for several reasons.
First, the American legislative branch, like the Canadian legis-
lative branch, currently appears to be a more progressive insti-
tution for consideration of civil rights than does our judicial sys-
tem. Recent conservative legal decisions suggest that many
legislatures at both the federal and state levels are currently the
more hospitable forum for achieving civil rights in the United
States.10 Second, as I argue below, constitutional argumentation
may have co-opted some of our feminist arguments or, more
specifically, our abortion arguments by making them "liberal"
rather than "radical.""1 Finally, although I do not find the au-
thoritarian argument convincing because it seems insufficiently
attentive to the safeguards that often exist to a greater degree in
a courtroom than in a legislative hearing,1 2 I do think that the
authoritarian argument raises the more general question of
7 This is in part because one of the first decisions rendered by their Supreme Court
after the ratification of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Constitution Act,
1982, Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (U.K., 1982, c.1l), Part I, Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms) harmed rather than benefited progressive interests. See Alberta
Union of Provincial Employees v. Attorney General of Alberta, 3 W.W.R. 577 (S.C.C.
1987) (right to strike and right to bargain collectively not constitutionally protected under
section 2(d) of the Charter, which guarantees freedom of association). For further dis-
cussion of this argument, see Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction, supra note 5.
8 See, e.g., Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction, supra note 5; Hutchinson, supra
note 6; MANDEL, supra note 6.
9 See, e.g., MANDEL, supra note 6.
"0 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (holding that
minority set-aside program which had been passed by city council was unconstitutional).
See also Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687-88, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-4a, 6107 (1988))
(overturning Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Title IX).
11 See infra Part II.
12 See generally Delgado, supra note 1.
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whether legal argumentation affects the kind of person one is.
That is, does argumentation, in whatever forum, move us away
from our aspirations for ourselves, as feminists?
As a religious feminist, I value compassion and constructive
dialogue-I try to find ways to listen to others in the words they
use to describe their own lives. Argumentation tends to stand in
the way of that task because, when we argue, we speak to con-
vince others rather than to learn for ourselves. Nevertheless, as
a lawyer living in Louisiana, which in my view is the heart of
discrimination in the United States, I frequently find myself en-
gaging in argumentation. While I try to preserve my feminist
sense of self, I find that I must argue on behalf of clients to help
them achieve structural changes in society and receive compen-
sation for the degrading discrimination that they have been forced
to endure. Yet, my conscience tugs at me and asks me how I can
continue to make arguments in the courtroom while I teach my
students the importance of dialogue and compassion in the
classroom.
I am finally developing some answers for my feminist con-
science. I would like to share them in the hope that we can
engage in dialogue to refine these answers further and so that we
can begin to reshape how we present constitutional arguments in
litigation. I will begin by discussing the importance of dialogue
and how the aspiration of dialogue relates to our work as feminist
lawyers. My purposes are to illustrate the importance of dialogue
to feminism and to explore whether there are times when argu-
mentation is appropriate, and if it is, how feminists can argue in
a more authentic feminist voice. In so doing I posit a model of
good faith argumentation which I feel is an important step in
improving feminist arguments concerning abortion. This model
suggests that good faith arguments in the abortion debate must
consider both women's well-being and the value of prenatal life.
I then apply my discussion of dialogue and good faith argumen-
tation to the kinds of arguments that feminists and others made
in William Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 3 concerning
whether Roe v. Wade should be overturned and abortion-policy
decisions left to the state legislatures for determination.14 Finally,
, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
,4 The Appellants presented seven questions for review by the Supreme Court in
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I apply these same principles in examining the Webster decision
itself.
Although the Court in Webster considered but did not resolve
the issue of whether Roe should be overturned, 15 we can be sure
that the question will be before the Court again soon.16 Whether
and how feminists should ask courts (rather than legislatures) to
resolve abortion policy issues continue to be important questions
for feminists to consider. I tentatively conclude that it is appro-
priate for us, as feminists, 7 to use constitutional argumentation
to deal with the abortion issue but that we did not make good
Webster. One issue involved standing; the others were substantive. They involved the
question of whether the following aspects of the Missouri statute were unconstitutional:
(1) the statute's preamble which declared that life begins at conception and that unborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being, (2) the requirement that
a physician determine gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child in
order to determine whether the fetus was of 20 or more weeks gestational age, (3) the
prohibition against using public funds to encourage or counsel a woman to have an
abortion not necessary to save her life, (4) the prohibition against any public employee
within the scope of his or her employment performing or assisting an abortion not
necessary to save the mother's life, and (5) the prohibition against any public facility
being used for the purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not necessary to save
the mother's life. In addition, the Appellants raised the question of whether the Roe
trimester approach by which state regulation of abortion services is reviewed should be
reconsidered and discarded in favor of the rational basis test. See Brief for Appellants at
i-ii, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No.
88-605) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. All of the briefs presented the final issue as a
question of how much deference should be given to the legislature to determine what
abortion regulations are appropriate. The final issue is the one I emphasize in this Article.
15 Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion (which was joined by Justices White and
Kennedy) stated:
This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe, which was
that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived
from the Due Process Clause, and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated
in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality
on this issue. She wrote, "[T]here is no necessity to accept the State's invitation to
reexamine the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade." Id. at 3060 (citations omitted). But
see id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) ("The simple truth is that Roe would not survive
the plurality's analysis, and that the plurality provides no substitute for Roe's protective
umbrella.")
16 Indeed, many state legislatures are preparing for the possibility that Roe might be
overturned. See infra note 27.
171 did not work on any of the briefs in the Webster case, although I was invited to do
so. Knowing that so many feminist briefs were going to be filed, I assumed that my
feminist perspective would be represented and that the quality of the briefs would be
excellent. Since reading the briefs in Webster and being disappointed with many of them,
I have become more active in legal-political work on abortion in Louisiana. Thus, I use
the phrase "we" to describe feminist legal-politica work on abortion.
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feminist arguments in the Webster case-that we not only risked
losing the rights gained in Roe but we also risked losing our own
understanding of the radical, equality-based rights we should be
seeking in the abortion area. In sum, feminists can and should
do a better job of making radical arguments while engaging in
constitutional litigation.
II. DIALOGUE
A. The Importance of Dialogue
1. The Dialogue/Argument Distinction
In this section, I posit a dichotomy: dialogue and argument.
Dialogue refers to conversations in which we may offer an opin-
ion, but are genuinely interested in learning the perspective of
the other person. We enter the conversation not to persuade, but
to learn. Leonard Swidler, a theologian committed to promoting
interfaith dialogue, offers the following definition of dialogue:
Dialogue of course is conversation between two or more
persons with differing views, the primary purpose of which
is for each participant to learn from the other so that both
can change and grow. Minimally, the very fact that I learn
that my dialogue partner believes "this" rather than "that"
changes my attitude toward that person; and a change in my
attitude is significant change and growth, in me. We enter
into dialogue, therefore, so that we can learn, change, and
grow, not so that we can force change on the other.
*.. Dialogue is not debate. In dialogue each partner must
listen to the other as openly and sympathetically as possible,
in an attempt to understand the other's position as precisely
and, as it were, as much from within, as possible.18
18 Leonard Swidler, Interreligious and Interideological Dialogue: The Matrix for All
Systematic Reflection Today, in TOWARD A UNIVERSAL THEOLOGY OF RELIGION 6 (Leon-
ard Swidler ed. 1987). See also Leonard Swidler, Toward Judeo-Christian-Buddhist Dia-
logue, in BUDDHISM MADE PLAIN: AN INTRODUCTION FOR CHRISTIANS AND JEWS Xiii
(Antony Fernando & Leonard Swidler eds. 1985). See also Ruth Colker, Feminism,
Theology, and Abortion, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1013, 1034-35 (1939) for further discussion of
Swidler's perspective on dialogue.
[Vol. 13
Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?
The key to dialogue, as defined by Swidler, is openness and
empathy. In contrast, argument refers to verbal statements in
which we offer an opinion for the purpose of persuasion, not for
the purpose of changing our own viewpoint.
In offering the dichotomy between dialogue and argument, I
know it is necessarily artificial. It is possible both to learn and to
persuade; it is possible for conversations to interweave both types
of conversation simultaneously. In addition, there may be other
styles of communication that do not fit my definition of dialogue
or argument. For example, rhetoric may be neither dialogue nor
argument because it is neither open to others nor meant to per-
suade. At their extremes, however, the two styles offer different
approaches and goals.
2. The Relationship of Dialogue to Feminism
Dialogue is deeply feminist. 19 It has helped women break the
silence about their lives and question men's ability to have "right"
answers with "universal" application. Instrumentally, it has been
a tool for overcoming subordination. The short-term benefits of
dialogue are obvious when women engage in consciousness-rais-
ing and cry from the joy of hearing their experiences as women
described, validated, and almost understood.
In addition, some feminists have even suggested that argumen-
tation is rarely appropriate. 20 As litigators, many of us may have
experienced winning a debate or case, knowing that our opponent
failed to make some of the best arguments available to him or
her. We know that we won because we made "better" arguments
19 Some women of color, however, have argued that favoring dialogue over argumen-
tation is a perspective more consistent with the socialization of white women than of
women of color because women of color have learned to channel anger in positive
directions. See, e.g., AUDRE LoDE, The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism,
in SISTER OUTSIDER 124-33 (1984). At the same time, other women of color have em-
phasized the importance of dialogue. For example, bell hooks, relying in part on the work
of the theologian Paulo Freire, argues that leaders of the feminist movement "should have
the ability to show love and compassion, show this love through their actions, and be
able to engage in successful dialogue." BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN
TO CENTER 161 (1984).
20 Cf. Rita Gross, Feminism From the Perspective of Buddhist Practice, I BUDDHIST-
CHRISTIAN STUDIES 73, 78 (1981) (suggesting that feminists should avoid angry, hard-
edged, or ideological arguments). See also Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion,
supra note 18, at 1036 for a discussion of Gross' recommendation that feminists do away
with rhetoric.
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than our opponent and not because we achieved litigation's
avowed goal of moving towards the "truth."
Even if it is true that argumentation has inherent limitations,
we still may find ourselves needing to engage in argumentation
because of the specific challenges of certain contexts.2' The key
to determining when argumentation is appropriate is to be sen-
sitive to context. This seems to me to be an especially important
question for us, as women, because we are socialized to listen
and not be heard;22 we live in a world in which men often seem
ignorant of our lives while we know theirs all too well. If the
purpose of dialogue is for us to learn from others, rather than to
impose our viewpoint on others, then it is easy to imagine how
calls for dialogue could help perpetuate women's subordination.
In sum, both dialogue and argumentation can be important and
valuable. The important point is to be aware of the shortcomings
of each mode of discourse and to consider context carefully when
deciding which mode to use.
B. Application of Dialogue to Law and Politics: Locating the
Proper Forum for Dialogue
As the previous discussion illustrates, the importance of en-
gaging in dialogue seems to be accepted by many members of
the feminist community. Three other general perspectives that
favor dialogue include the democratic, religious, and critical per-
spectives, although some people support dialogue from all three
perspectives. In this section, I will explore each of these per-
spectives and highlight the disagreements within each on the
practical application of that perspective to the role of the courts,
specifically in the context of the abortion controversy. Based on
21 There are also times when we are forced to choose silence over both dialogue and
argumentation. For example, there have been times when I have been accosted or insulted
by a man on the street, and I have chosen silence out of fear. Engaging in dialogue,
despite my religious-feminist sensibility, has not occurred to me. On other occasions,
when a man has yelled a derogatory expression at me, I have yelled a derogatory epithet
back, despite my fear of his violence. I have chosen to speak angrily, not because I
wanted to learn from him, but because I wanted him to learn from me.
2 For an excellent discussion of this problem, see CATHERINE KELLER, FROM A BRo-
KEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM AND SELF (1986); ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS
AND SILENCE (1979).
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a critical examination of arguments made by each perspective
and upon my earlier discussion of the importance of dialogue to
feminism, I will develop principles that we can use in determining
how and when to engage in argumentation rather than dialogue.
1. Democratic Perspective
The democratic perspective contends that it is good for society
to engage in constructive dialogue. The former Solicitor General
utilized this perspective in Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices to argue for judicial restraint.23 He stated that it is important
that a "constructive" rather than "inflammatory" dialogue take
place in the legislature on the abortion issue and that judicial
restraint is needed to facilitate that dialogue. He said:
As long as the various factions continue to look to the courts,
however, a constructive dialogue will be impossible.[15]
n. 15: The Court's continuing effort to oversee virtually all
elements of the abortion controversy has seriously distorted
the nature of abortion legislation. Because Roe and its prog-
eny have resolved most of the central questions about the
permissible scope of abortion regulation, legislative action
in this area has been relegated to relatively peripheral issues.
And because legislators know that whatever they enact in
this area will be subject to de novo review by the courts,
they have little incentive to try to moderate their positions.
The result, all too often, has been statutes that are significant
primarily because of their highly 'inflammatory' symbolic
content-such as fetal description requirements and human
disposal provisions. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 n.10. This
process has undermined the accountability of legislative bod-
ies, and has disserved the courts and the Constitution. As
James Bradley Thayer once observed, the "tendency of a
common and easy resort" to the power of judicial review "is
to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden
2 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, William L.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 3, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [herein-
after Brief for the United States]. See also Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion,
supra note 18, at 1073 for a brief discussion of this point.
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its sense of moral responsibility." J.B. Thay, John Marshall
106-07 (1901).24
Judicial restaint, he argued, would move us closer to constructive
dialogue because it would force legislatures to respond to the
abortion issue responsibly rather than through inflammatory leg-
islation that they know will be overturned by the courts.
The Appellees in Webster did not dispute the importance of
constructive dialogue on the abortion issue; they disagreed with
the Appellants about the effect the Court's decision in Webster
would have on that dialogue in the legislatures. They argued that
overturning Roe would contribute to rather than abate inflam-
matory legislation in the abortion area:
The Solicitor General notes the tendency of some state leg-
islatures to enact "inflammatory" abortion statutes and re-
markably blames Roe for this phenomenon. S.G. Brief at 21
n.15. A more honest assessment would blame hostility in
those legislatures to a woman's right to choose abortion.
That assessment indicates that if Roe is eliminated, inflam-
matory legislation will not abate, but will flourish unchecked.
Indeed, five states have announced their intention to crimin-
alize abortion (except only to save the life of the mother) if
and when this Court permits them to do so.25
They argued that judicial activism is needed to moderate the
inflammatory dialogue of the state legislatures.
As I have argued in another article, 26 I think it is clear that the
Appellees are correct as to the likely effect of the Court reversing
Roe and leaving the abortion issue to state legislatures. Five state
legislatures already have enacted legislation that will criminalize
abortion if Roe is overturned. 27 The former Solicitor General
recognizes that such a response to the overturning of Roe would
not reflect constructive dialogue, yet he apparently did not take
24 Id. at 21 & 21 n.15.
25 Brief for Appellees at 17-18 n.30, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees].
26 See Ruth Colker, Abortion and Dialogue, 63 TUL. L. Rav. 1363 (1989).
27 These states are Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Illinois, and South Dakota. Ste Brief
for Appellees, supra note 18, at 18 n.30.
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seriously the possibility that state legislatures would act on their
stated intentions if Roe were overturned.
Our experience with the abortion issue in United States federal
and state legislatures, however, should convince us that legisla-
tures would follow through on their stated intentions and engage
in inflammatory rather than constructive dialogue. Congress' be-
havior can be predicted by its coverage of abortion under Medi-
caid. The Supreme Court's decision in Patricia R. Harris v. Cora
McRae28 gave Congress wide discretion in creating rules with
respect to funding abortions for poor women under Medicaid. At
the time Harris was decided Congress was providing Medicaid
funding for abortions when a pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest, or when the woman's life was endangered as a result of
the pregnancy. At issue in Harris was the constitutionality of an
earlier version of the Hyde Amendment that had provided funding
only when the woman's life was in danger. According to the
former Solicitor General, we can determine whether constructive
dialogue has taken place by seeing if the United States "is out of
step with the legislative judgment of virtually every other country
with which we share a common cultural tradition .... -29 Using
this standard, therefore, we should be able to see whether Harris
led to constructive dialogue by comparing legislation in the
United States with that of other western countries. The govern-
ments of nearly every other western country currently fund broad
categories of therapeutic abortions for poor women. 30 In sharp
contrast, Congress has responded to its legislative freedom by
cutting back even further on the categories of abortions that
would be funded by Medicaid-eliminating funding for pregnan-
cies that result from rape and incest and preventing the District
of Columbia from using its own tax dollars to fund therapeutic
- 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
2 Brief for the United States, supra note 23, at 23.
30 Countries that provide for or subsidize all legally indicated abortions from public
funds include Australia, Austria, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and Switzerland. See Brief of Amici Curiae International Women's Health Organi-
zations in Support of Appellees at 14 n.50, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief of International Women's
Health Organizations]. See also Rebecca J. Cook, International Dimensions of the De-
partment of Justice Arguments in the Webster Case, 17 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 384,
386-87 (1989).
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abortions for poor women. 31 The United States has moved well
below the level of concern for women's well-being that has been
established elsewhere in the western world. Thus, under the
Solicitor General's own test, I would say that our experience
with the abortion issue not only shows that we cannot trust
Congress if Roe is overturned but also that it is time to reconsider
our confidence in Congress and overturn Harris v. McRae so that
the United States can begin to move toward a more humane level
of health care. As this discussion shows, Congress has proven
itself incapable of engaging in constructive dialogue on the abor-
tion issue.32
Similarly, many state legislatures provide no room for optimism
with respect to the abortion issue. For example, Louisiana first
responded to Webster in the legislature by trying to reinstate its
criminal abortion statute, which provides for a penalty of a ten-
year prison term for a doctor who performs an abortion.33 It then
supported the efforts of District Attorney Harry Connick to rein-
state Louisiana's criminal abortion statute through litigation since
the criminal abortion statute had never been repealed.34 It was
only through successful legal argument that those efforts failed, 35
Rather than create more constructive dialogue, the Webster de-
cision has fueled new attempts to circumvent normal legislative
processes in Louisiana in order to institute a criminal abortion
statute.3 6 Thus, while some states' attempts to enact restrictive
31 H.R. CONF. REP. 1013, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H9174-85 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1988).
32 It is true that Congress recently tried to expand Medicaid coverage for abortion to
include rape and incest, but President Bush vetoed that effort. (Irvin Molotsky, As
Expected, Bush Vetoes Bill That Would Pay for Some Abortions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1989, § 1, at 32, col. 3). Those efforts received much publicity and were heralded as an
enormous victory. But realistically, those efforts, even if they had been successful, would
have still left the United States far behind the rest of the western world and no further
ahead than at the time of the Harris v. McRae decision. Congress' action was therefore
more symbolic than substantive and gives us little reason to be optimistic about Congres-
sional action in the area of abortion.
33 See La. H. Con. Res. 10 (Regular 1989). See also Colker, Feminism, Theology, and
Abortion, supra note 18, at 83, for a further discussion.
34 See Linda Faye Weeks v. Harry Connick, No. 73-469 (E.D. La.) (motion under
Federal Rule 60(B)(5) to dissolve the court's injunction against enforcement of Louisiana's
criminal abortion statute denied January 23, 1990).
35 Id.
3 Similarly restrictive abortion regulations have been passed in other states like Penn-
sylvania. See Pennsylvania Abortion Limits Become Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989,
at A38, col. 5.
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abortion legislation have been unsuccessful, as in Florida,3 7 the
responses of states like Louisiana demonstrate that states are not
necessarily the proper fora for abortion policy decisions at this
point in our history.
We also should not exaggerate the importance of recent pro-
choice legislative victories in assessing the relationship between
judicial activism and dialogue. If we, as a society, had not been
forced by the courts to live in a pro-choice regime for seventeen
years, women would probably not be fighting so hard at the
present moment to keep those rights through the legislative pro-
cess. Having experienced how reproductive freedom has dra-
matically improved their lives, women have come to realize the
importance of articulating pro-choice arguments to legislatures.
Thus, judicial activism can play an important role in adjusting
social attitudes while pre-empting legislative decisionmaking for
a while.
In sum, arguments for judicial restraint in the abortion area are
unsatisfactory when they flow from an unqualified argument fa-
voring democracy. Whether judicial restraint leads to construc-
tive dialogue is a question that must be answered contextually.
Unqualified arguments for democracy also fail to acknowledge
the historical significance and importance of the fourteenth
amendment in safeguarding the needs of women and racial mi-
norities. The purpose of strict judicial scrutiny and judicial acti-
vism under the fourteenth amendment is to protect minorities
that do not have effective access to the political process from
discriminatory state action. 38 Our experience with abortion reg-
ulations suggests that women, especially poor women, likewise
do not have sufficient access to the political process to safeguard
their well-being at the local or national level. Thus, as I will
discuss later, I consider it important to construct equality-based
arguments under the fourteenth amendment to demonstrate why
37 See R.W. Apple, Jr., An Altered Political Climate Suddenly Surrounds Abortion,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
38 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4. See also JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 167 (1980)
(suggesting that laws containing sex classifications that were enacted prior to women's
suffrage should be invalidated). Interestingly, Ely failed to apply this same analysis to the
nineteenth century abortion law that was at issue in Roe. See John Hart Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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our democratic-constitutional regime should not tolerate state
legislatures' enacting abortion restrictions which disregard the
well-being of women.
2. Religious Perspective
The religious perspective also asserts that dialogue is good for
society. This perspective is described by Professor Michael Perry.
He states:
Any moral community for which love of neighbor (agape) is
a constitutive ideal ... should understand that ecumenical
openness to the Other in discourse facilitates (as well as
expresses) such love: I can hardly love the Other-the real,
particular other-unless I listen to her and, in listening, gain
in knowledge of her.39
Perry suggests that we should engage in dialogue because dia-
logue facilitates our developing a truly loving society.
However, religious proponents of dialogue also disagree on
where such dialogue is best facilitated. Perry, who supports a
nonoriginalist interpretation of the Constitution, argues for judi-
cial restraint in the abortion context to enhance legislative dia-
logue.4 Perry endorses a particular kind of dialogue, a "deliber-
ative, transformative dialogue"-"one in which the questions of
what ought we to want and, therefore, who ought we to be are
open, not closed. ' '41 In contrast, also speaking from a religious
perspective, Catholics for a Free Choice supported judicial activ-
ism in Webster to enhance moral reflection throughout society:
"It is contrary to Catholic moral tradition to cut off debate,
decision and reflection on a subject or [sic] moral significance by
39 
MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 51-52
(1988). See also Colker, Abortion and Dialogue, supra note 26 (reviewing Perry's book
and discussing these points in greater detail).
40Id. at ch. 6.
41 Id. at 152.
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legislative fiat. ' 42 Professor Perry and Catholics for a Free Choice
ground their arguments in a similar moral perspective yet they
reach different conclusions about how to achieve their goals for
society. Perry believes that the evil to be overcome is the "im-
perialism" of the judiciary; 43 Catholics For a Free Choice believe
the evil to be overcome is "legislative fiat."
The problem with Perry's perspective is that he speaks broadly
about the universal importance of legislative dialogue without
considering the concrete realities of a given situation. As I sug-
gested above, it is not likely that legislatures would have engaged
in "deliberative, transformative dialogue" if the Supreme Court
had acted with more restraint in Roe. We would have instead
witnessed legislatures disempowering women, especially poor
women. Because Perry's democratic argument fails in the specific
context of abortion, we are left with only his religious assertion
about the beneficial effects of being open to others' viewpoints.
As Catholics for a Free Choice points out, that argument can
support judicial activism to prevent "legislative fiat" as well as
judicial restraint to prevent "judicial imperialism."
3. Critical Perspective
The critical perspective also favors dialogue, but it searches
for ways to engage in dialogue in a radical rather than liberal
voice.44 However, critical theorists disagree on what form this
dialogue should take.
For example, some critical theorists argue that constitutional
discourse is essentially liberal. Many feminists and leftist people
in Canada, relying on this critical perspective, oppose using the
Charter to achieve change in society. One proponent of this
perspective, Professor Judy Fudge, argues that constitutional ar-
42 Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice, Chicago Catholic Women, National Coalition
of American Nuns, Women in Spirit of Colorado Task Force, et al., As Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellees at 25-26, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice].
41 See PERRY, supra note 40, at 172; See also Colker, Abortion and Dialogue, supra
note 26, at 1375; Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 18, at 1073-74.
4See, e.g., CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan C. Hutchinson ed. 1989); THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed. 1982).
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guments co-opt feminist arguments into abstract liberal argu-
ments, undermine democracy, and enhance authoritarianism. She
states:
Feminist demands can be accommodated with the formal
notions of equality or the negative concept of autonomy
which are a part and parcel of liberal rights, but by cele-
brating the Charter feminists risk legitimating abstract rights
which have been used to attack legislation which redistrib-
utes power, however marginally, from the powerful to the
disadvantaged. The problem with endorsing Charter litiga-
tion as a terrain of progressive struggle is that it requires the
concrete to be translated into the abstract, while simulta-
neously transferring power away from institutions which are
in principle democratic to institutions which are by definition
authoritarian.
45
She suggests that the Canadian Charter is not the best vehicle
for achieving feminist goals.
Professor Michael Mandel, also a Canadian, argues against
using the Charter for change in society in even stronger terms,
emphasizing the inherently authoritarian nature of constitutional
discourse. Mandel says:
Then there is the authoritarian nature of the courts which
makes the whole thing not only dishonest but also demean-
ing. Pleading is not a democratic form of discourse. It dates
from a time when democracy was a dirty word. Expanding
that form of discourse to more and more corners of life, as
the Charter does, is in effect seeking to return to that time.
I do not like the idea of going backwards in history. The
courts try to instill in us an acceptance of arbitrary hierarchy,
a one-way respect that is not based on whether it is deserved
but on the (literally) elevated position of the person we are
supposed to respect. The Charter exalts courts even more.
I think they should be cut down to size. 46
4' Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction, supra note 5, at 551 (citations omitted).
"Mandel, supra note 6, at ix-x.
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Thus, Mandel rejects the arbitrary hierarchy of the courts in
general, and constitutional discourse in particular.
While Fudge and Mandel use critical perspectives to argue
against the use of constitutional argumentation, other critical
scholars in the United States do not share their pessimistic per-
spective on constitutional discourse. For example, Professor
Mari Matsuda disputes the validity of the dichotomy between
making constitutional arguments and retaining a radical perspec-
tive on social change.47 She argues that by using the Constitution,
women and people of color can transform the Constitution itself
into a more radical document. For example, she notes that Fred-
erick Douglass eventually rejected his initial belief that the Con-
stitution was "a corrupt document that endorsed slavery" and
argued instead that the Constitution contained a "ringing indict-
ment of slavery. 48 Douglass may not have been successful in
imbedding that meaning in the Constitution in his lifetime, but
Martin Luther King, Jr. and his followers were able to draw a
more radical meaning out of the Constitution in the twentieth
century.49 Matsuda concludes from these and other examples that
"[tlhis ability to adopt and transform standard texts and main-
stream consciousness is an important contribution of those on
the bottom. '50 Rather than assume, as do Fudge and Mandel,
that the constitutional text is bound by its original, liberal mean-
ing, Matsuda argues that women and people of color can be a
part of a process that transforms the Constitution into a more
radical document.
Matsuda offers a powerful example of using liberal, constitu-
tional arguments without being co-opted. She points to efforts by
third-generation Japanese Americans to delegitimize the intern-
ment of Japanese Americans during World War II through argu-
ments based on the Bill of Rights. Having been interned during
the Second World War in a tragic disregard for basic human and
civil rights, they later demanded their basic human rights through
rights-based constitutional discourse. Despite the fact that Japa-
nese Americans have continued to pursue rights-based, legalistic
47 Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987).
4aId. at 334.
49 Id. at 334-35.
" Id. at 335.
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claims, Matsuda insists that they have not abandoned their hopes
of radical social change.51 On the one hand, they work within the
legal system using rights-based arguments, while on the other,
they engage in radical work within the political community, such
as seeking reparations and other changes. She argues that the life
experience of people of color shows that one can have "dual
consciousness"--using rights language while recognizing the idea
of legal indeterminacy.
Matsuda's work values the role that women and people of color
can have in creating meaning in society-a role that is essential
to constructive dialogue. 52 Her disagreement with Fudge is both
practical and historical. Fudge cites numerous examples where
she contends that constitutional arguments by feminists in Can-
ada have been corrupt feminist arguments and not part of radical
social change.5 3 Matsuda, on the other hand, cites numerous
examples where she contends that constitutional arguments by
people of color in the United States have been a part of radical
social change.5 4 The conclusion we can draw from both is that
we need to be sensitive to context when we consider whether
constitutional arguments are inherently corrupt or potentially
radical.
This examination of various perspectives on dialogue suggests
that the decision whether to look to courts or legislatures for
constructive dialogue depends upon context. As I have sug-
gested, achieving constructive dialogue is a goal that is especially
important for feminists. Thus, whether feminists should turn to
the legislatures or to the courts to advance their concerns depends
on the issue' at hand and the historical circumstances surrounding
it. As we have seen, we have little reason to be optimistic about
the ability of the legislatures to engage in constructive dialogue
in the context of abortion. Matsuda's work suggests that feminists
with a radical agenda might do well to look to constitutional
argumentation in contexts such as this. The question which re-
mains, however, is how to argue when we do resort to the courts.
51 Id. at 340.
-2 Leonard Swidler lists criteria which are essential to constructive dialogue; respecting
the voices of disadvantaged people in society is central to his framework for dialogue.
See supra note 18 for a listing of Swidler's works.
51 See Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction, supra note 5.
4 See supra note 47.
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III. ARGUMENT
A. Incorporating Aspects of Dialogue into Feminist Arguments
In the previous section I concluded that there are times when
argument is more appropriate than dialogue. A further question
to consider, however, is whether when we do engage in argu-
mentation, we can do so in a more "dialogical" way. That is, is
it possible to frame arguments that maintain an openness to the
other side?
This question is especially important for feminists given fem-
inism's recognition of the problem of consciousness. 5 Much of
feminist theory recognizes that all viewpoints are inherently sub-
jective and purports to be very cautious in knowing the "right
answer." 56 Feminists emphasize the continual need for women to
engage in consciousness-raising, 57 knowing that women cannot
at this time be truly confident that they see accurately their
position in society.
The problem of consciousness has made some feminists strug-
gle with the question of whether feminism is doomed to a hopeless
moral relativism, unable to take positions on any issues. In re-
sponse, Zillah Eisenstein suggests that a feminist recognition that
there is no objective truth should not stop us from acting based
on our world view; rather she suggests that "[w]e must leave
meanings open at the same time that we act upon them.
'58
An approach that denies the possibility of objective truth and
insists upon the need to maintain openness makes it difficult to
justify the strong, forceful tone of legal argumentation. This dif-
ficulty is apparent in comparing Professor Martha Minow's aca-
-- See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: Dis-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 216 (1978).
6 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10
(1987); SONIA JOHNSON, GOING OUT OF OUR MINDS: THE METAPHYSICS OF LIBERATION
320-21 (1987).
5 This is a central tenet of Catharine MacKinnon's work. She has called consciousness-
raising the methodology of feminist theory. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105 (1989). See also Colker, Feminism,
Theology, and Abortion, supra note 18, at 1034 for a discussion of dialogue as a technique
of consciousness-raising.
S ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 24 (1988).
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demic and legal work. On the one hand, Minow argues in a law
review article that when we take a position, we must remain open
to the possibility that on another occasion our opponents may
convince us that they are right.5 9 Her academic tone is cautious,
apparently reflecting her belief that there is no objective truth
and that we must maintain openness in articulating our viewpoint.
On the other hand, Minow argued in a brief in Webster that the
Missouri abortion statute was unconstitutional because it violated
freedom of religion.6° This criticism was not cautious; it was
forceful and apparently confident of its accuracy. Her legal ar-
gument about abortion does not appear consistent with her aca-
demic perspective about how to represent a point of view.
Some might say that an open voice is inappropriate for the
courtroom-that there is no harm in speaking firmly in the court-
room and openly in an academic context. However, I reject that
dichotomy. I believe that feminists can afford to speak in a more
open voice in the courtroom. This conviction emerges from a
consideration of Professor Lynne Henderson's writing.61 Hen-
derson argues that feminists can maintain an open, empathetic
perspective while also using the courts to make legal arguments.
She focuses on the need for legal arguments to be couched in
empathy:
Empathy may enable the decisionmaker to see other "right"
answers, or a continuum of answers. Or it may simply make
the decisionmaker aware that what once seemed like no
choice or a clear choice is instead a tragic one. To mask the
tragedy of choice by taking refuge in rules does not negate
the tragedy.6
2
59 Minow, supra note 56, at 93.
60 See Brief Amicus Curiae for American Jewish Congress, Board of Homeland Min-
istries-United Church of Christ, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Coun-
cil, The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) by James E. Andrews as Stated Clerk of General
Assembly, The Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights, St. Louis Catholics for Choice,
and 30 other religious groups, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief for Religious Groups].
61 See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574
(1987). See also Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 18, at 20-21 for
a further discussion of Henderson's approach.
6 Henderson, supra note 61, at 1653. See also Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abor-
tion, supra note 18, at 1030.
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Thus empathy can help one see one's own as well as the other's
position more clearly.
Henderson's approach provides us with a framework through
which we can argue that our opponent is wrong yet also recognize
that our own position has tragic aspects. For example, I find it
commonplace in personal discussions about abortion for feminists
to acknowledge that abortion is a tragic choice. Nevertheless, I
have never found empathy to be a part of any of the legal argu-
ments constructed by feminists on the abortion issue that I have
examined. 6
3
The lack of empathy in feminist arguments against state regu-
lation of abortion actually weakens the arguments. Feminists
usually respond to the emotional images of fetal life presented by
pro-life advocates with silence. They fail to address why we as
a society regretfully must terminate that life to protect women's
well-being and instead talk about women's well-being as if the
reader is not struggling with the question of how to protect the
value of prenatal life. However, if the court and many Americans
were not struggling with that question, then there would not be
a legal controversy.
In addition, the traditional pro-choice argument about abortion
is a liberal privacy argument that defends a woman's right to
choose an abortion as part of her individual autonomy. That
argument, although successful in the courts for seventeen years,
is not the best available argument because it makes it appear as
if the pro-life movement is standing on higher moral ground be-
cause it is concerned about broad social welfare while feminists
are concerned about liberal individualism and not about social
welfare.64
As Zillah Eisenstein has, persuasively argued, feminist theory
is implicitly group-based; feminist theory cannot be embedded in
liberal individualism because it necessarily recognizes that
women are a sex-class. 65 Thus, the pro-choice position stands in
tension with feminist theory. It was a pragmatic argument that
63 For an example of an empathetic abortion argument, see discussion of Justice Wil-
son's opinion in Morganteler infra in Section III(C)(2).
6 For elaboration of this point, see KATHLEEN MCDONNELL, NOT AN EASY CHOICE:
A FEMINIST RE-EXAMINES ABORTION (1984). See also Colker, Feminism, Theology, and
Abortion, supra note 18, at 1030.
6 See ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FuTuPE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM (1981).
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was crafted to win the Roe case because it seemed compatible
with liberal constitutional law. 6 Rather than risk being further
co-opted by our possibly misguided sense of what is good con-
stitutional law, I suggest that feminists need to start constructing
more authentically feminist arguments in the abortion area. Pro-
choice arguments have become so commonplace in feminist dis-
cussions of abortion that I am afraid that feminists have lost sight
of the implicitly nonfeminist aspect of that argument. Feminists
need to replace the phrase "pro-choice" with a phrase that is
more centrally "pro-women."
B. Defining Good Faith Disagreements
The preceding discussion suggested that feminists need to in-
corporate elements of dialogue into their legal arguments. In this
section I explore more fully the relationship of dialogue to legal
argumentation and posit a model which I feel is important to
follow in framing our arguments.
As the discussion of various perspectives on dialogue illus-
trated, 67 there is no agreement on the relationship between judi-
cial activism and achieving dialogue. Yet, there is agreement that
the dialogue we should be seeking is "constructive," "transfor-
mative," in "good faith" or "respectable." However, few attempts
are offered to define these various terms. Neither the Solicitor
General nor the Appellees in Webster attempted to define what
they meant by constructive or inflammatory dialogue. The brief
by Catholics for a Free Choice defined something as the subject
of "respectable debate" simply in terms of whether various au-
thorities hold the position:
A moral option comes within respectable debate if it is sup-
ported by serious reasons which commend themselves to
many people, and if it has been endorsed by a number of
authorities in the field of ethics, and if it has been approved
6See generally Henderson, supra note 61, 1620-31.
67 See supra Part 11(B).
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by reputable religious and other humanitarian bodies. D.
Maguire, The New Subversives 121 (1982)6
Thus, Catholics for a Free Choice offer us no real guidance on
what actually makes a debate respectable.
I have found it more useful to try to define the concept of a
"good faith" disagreement over which people should attempt dia-
logue than to work with the term "respectable" which connotes
conformity to societal norms. The term "good faith" describes
the value of respect which may make dialogue possible even if
the speakers do not comport with societal norms.69 A good faith
disagreement is one characterized by respect, both for the people
affected by the issue under discussion and for the arguments
made on each side of the issue.70
The legal dispute over the constitutionality of Japanese Amer-
ican internment during the Second World War, as considered in
Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States,71 exemplifies a disagree-
ment not carried on in good faith. It was not a good faith dis-
agreement because neither the government's position nor the way
in which the position was articulated by the government attorneys
reflected respect for the well-being of Japanese American people.
The government's position reflected a lack of respect for the
Japanese American people because the government had no evi-
dence that any Japanese American had committed an act of sab-
otage; it argued for internment simply by relying on the stereo-
type that Japanese Americans would be more loyal to Japan than
to the United States. 72 Second, the government's lack of respect
61 Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice, supra note 42, at 26.
69 See Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 18 for a further discussion
of this point.
70 See Colker, Abortion and Dialogue, supra note 26, at I n.1 for an expanded definition
of good faith disagreement.
71 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
72 The only evidence of "disloyalty" offered by the government and accepted by the
Court to justify the internment was the following: "Approximately five thousand American
citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States
and to renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, and several thousand evacuees
requested repatriation to Japan." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219. The first piece of "evi-
dence" referred to the fact that Japan recognized dual citizenship, which some individuals
desired. The second piece of "evidence" referred to how Japanese Americans responded
to the internment; not surprisingly, some of them responded by wanting to leave the
United States. (For an excellent critique of the Korematsu decision, see Justice Murphy's
dissent. Id. at 233-42.) It would have been unthinkable for German Americans to have
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for the well-being of Japanese Americans is apparent in state-
ments made about the case by government lawyers. 73 Herbert
Wechsler, for example, made the following statement about Ko-
rematsu in his seminal 1959 law review article on the use of
"neutral principles":
Only the other day I read that the Japanese evacuation,
which I thought an abomination when it happened, though
in the line of duty as a lawyer I participated in the effort to
sustain it in the Court, is now believed by many to have
been a blessing to its victims, breaking down forever the
ghettos in which they had previously lived. 74
Notice the lack of respect for Japanese Americans reflected in
Wechsler's comments: he supposedly thought the internment
(which he mislabels an "evacuation") was an abomination when
it happened, yet he participated in the government's fraudulent
behavior by constructing arguments in favor of it; he refers to
Japanese Americans as "Japanese" as if they were not Ameri-
cans; and he- readily accepts as true a newspaper story that
claimed that breaking up and interning a community was a good
way to disperse a population throughout society.
Matsuda, by contrast, offers a more accurate and respectful
description of the effects of the internment on Japanese
Americans:
Many interned families lost homes and possessions in bar-
gain basement evacuation sales, while others lost property
in racially motivated escheat trials promoted by the Califor-
nia government. Farm families that had spent generations
been interned out of concern that they would be loyal to Germany rather than to the
United States; however, it was exactly that kind of ethnic/national stereotyping that led
to the internment of Japanese Americans.
7 In addition, the implausibility of the government's position in Korematsu seems
obvious today when, even former President Reagan, who was never famous for his
sensitivity to minority rights, agreed to compensate Japanese Americans for their injury
from internment. Moreover, Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had supported the internment
when he was governor of California, wrote in his memoirs that he "deeply regretted" the
internment and thought that it demonstrated "the cruelty of war when fear, get-tough
military psychology, propaganda and racial antagonism combine." Matsuda, supra note
47, at 363 n.161 (quoting THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JusTicE EARL WARREN 149 (1977)).
. 74 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Lai', 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1959) (citations omitted).
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reclaiming unusable land lost the fruits of their toil. Even
more devastating than the loss of property was the loss of
opportunity. Many of the Issei, or first-generation immi-
grants, were deprived of their most productive years, the
period when their hard work, experience and careful invest-
ments might have yielded the financial security that many
were never able to achieve after internment. 75
Matsuda's description illustrates an attempt to inject an element
of good faith into the debate over the Japanese American intern-
ment by viewing the controversy through the eyes of Japanese
Americans.
In sum, my definition of good faith dialogue is embedded in
concrete reality, not abstract imaginings of a world in which we
do not live.
C. Application of Good Faith Argumentation to the Abortion
Issue
In this section, I will illustrate how good faith arguments could
be made concerning the abortion issue. Assume that two people
disagree about the appropriateness of the legislature restricting
abortions. I argue that this disagreement is not in good faith if
either party does not respect the well-being of women. In addi-
tion, this disagreement is not in good faith if either party does
not respect the value of prenatal life. However, that disagreement
could be in good faith because people who respect the well-being
of women can consider abortion to be immoral and people who
consider abortion to be moral can respect the value of prenatal
life. Examples of all of these possibilities are readily apparent.
1. Arguments in Favbr of Regulation of Abortion
Let us start with the abortion dispute in Roe v. Wade. At issue
was the constitutionality of a state statute that criminalized abor-
tion except in cases necessary to save the pregnant woman's life.
The plaintiff in Roe alleged that she was not able to obtain an
7- Matsuda, supra note 47, at 364-65.
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abortion lawfully although she had become pregnant as the result
of a rape.76 The position of Texas in Roe, that a state could
constitutionally make it a criminal act for a woman to procure an
abortion, even when she was the victim of rape, was not made
in good faith because it did not reflect respect for the well-being
of women.
As I have argued in another article, an individual who respects
the well-being of women cannot take the position that the appro-
priate response to an unwanted pregnancy, especially one which
allegedly occurred as the result of a rape, is a lengthy prison term
if the woman seeks an abortion. 77 A woman who has become
pregnant as the result of a rape has already faced one of the most
coercive experiences that a woman can experience in her lifetime.
Her person has been invaded on an intimate level. One tragic
consequence of this coercive invasion is a pregnancy. If the
criminal law's purpose is to deter immoral activity, criminalizing
the woman's behavior would not effectively deter immoral be-
havior. The immoral behavior that has occurred is the rape. Even
if one considered the abortion also to constitute immoral behav-
ior, the criminal law could not act as a deterrent since the preg-
nant woman never intended to have sexual activity which could
result in a pregnancy. Alternatively, if the purpose of the criminal
law is to penalize an individual for having engaged in immoral
activity, it is hard to imagine how this woman is deserving of
such punishment. She has already suffered enormously; further
suffering through a prison sentence because she could not bear
to continue with her pregnancy seems brutally disrespectful of
her well-being.
78
Although evidence of disrespect for women's well-being is
probably easiest to see when a state prohibits abortion even in
76 See MARIAN FAUX, ROE V. WADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LANDMARK SU-
PREME COURT DECISION THAT MADE ABORTION LEGAL 8 (1988). The plaintiff has since
recanted her story of rape; however, that does not change the fact that she claimed she
had been raped at the time that the original lawsuit was filed, nor did the Court's decision
depend on this issue.
'n See Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 18, at 1050-52. See also
Colker, Abortion and Dialogue, supra note 26, at 1379-8 1.
7 The United States apparently conceded this point in Webster because it stated that
if the Court were to adopt an undue burden analysis, "a regulation that prohibits abortion
in cases of rape or incest presumably would entail an undue burden, because in such
cases, where the pregnancy is the result of coercion, a woman has not been afforded a
meaningful opportunity to avoid pregnancy through alternative means." Brief for the
United States, supra note 29, at 23 n.16.
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the case of rape, we can also see that evidence of disrespect
starkly by examining the impact of the criminalization of abortion
on the lives of poor women. Abortion prohibitions, which are
supposedly intended to protect the life of the unborn, actually
cost poor women their lives and health.79 A woman who is poor
and faces an unwanted pregnancy knowing she cannot afford to
have a child suffers no less than a woman who becomes pregnant
as the result of a rape if abortion is criminalized.
Rather than victimize women further when they face an un-
wanted pregnancy, I would argue that a more respectful approach
to unwanted pregnancies would try to change the conditions
under which unwanted pregnancies, occur, focusing our attention
on men's failure to take responsibility for use of birth control
and the lack of safe and effective birth control options for men
and woman. A more respectful approach would also limit the
need for abortions by focusing our attention on how we can make
this a better society in which women can bear and help raise
children. Rather than "blame the victim," we need to understand
that women do not engage in sexual activity in an effort to face
an unwanted pregnancy. To prevent abortions we need to break
the link between sexual activity and unwanted pregnancy, not
punish only the woman after an unwanted pregnancy has
occurred.
The lack of respect for women embedded in Texas' position in
Roe also becomes apparent if one examines the state attorney's
statements about women.80 For example, the State of Texas
opened the first set of arguments with the following remark: "'Mr.
Chief Justice, may it please the Court: It's an old joke, but when
a man argues against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going
to have the last word."
81
79 See Cook, supra note 30, at 389.
8 As with the Japanese-American internment example, I can also turn to contemporary
Republican politics to support my observation. Even President George Bush, an individual
not well-known for his sensitivity to women's issues, has taken the position that criminal
sanctions against pregnant women who choose abortions is not the appropriate response
to the abortion problem. During the presidential campaign, Vice President Bush's spo-
kesperson said, in clarifying the candidate's position, "Frankly, he thinks that a woman
in a situation like that [unwanted pregnancy] would be more properly considered an
additional victim, perhaps the second victim. That she would need help and love and not
punishment." Bush Camp Offers a Clarified Stand About Abortions, N.Y. Times, Sept.
27, 1988, at Al, col. 4 & B7, col 3.
"I Henderson, supra note 61, at 1622, n.303 (quoting from tapes of the oral argument).
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These examples show that the disagreement at issue in Roe v.
Wade was not a good faith disagreement because it was not
embedded in minimal respect for women's well-being. I therefore
conclude that argumentation in the form of constitutional litiga-
tion was an appropriate response to the Texas legislation because
real dialogue is not possible when a base of respect does not
exist. Nevertheless, the question that remains is how that argu-
mentation could have been conducted in a more authentically
feminist voice.
Some religious feminists favor state regulation of abortion but
do so in a framework that is sensitive to women's well-being as
well as to the value of prenatal life. For example, religious fem-
inist Lisa Sowle Cahill makes an argument for state regulation of
abortion that respects the value of women in our society but also
recognizes that women should bear some responsibility in our
society for protecting life. Under that framework, she supports
some regulation of abortion.82 Similarly, Feminists for Life of
America argued in Webster that if women were fully informed
about the consequences of terminating prenatal life they would
choose not to have abortions. They argued that the state can
protect both women's emotional health and prenatal life by in-
sisting that women become more fully informed before being able
to have an abortion. 3 They attempted to make arguments in favor
of state regulation of abortion that included considerations of
women's well-being.
Neither Cahill nor Feminists for Life of America favors crim-
inal regulation of abortion, nor do they support a complete ban
on abortion. Unfortunately, because their arguments arose in the
context of analyzing specific regulations, they do not offer much
guidance on what regulations would be acceptable within their
frameworks. Nevertheless, while I do not agree with their argu-
ments, the arguments do raise the possibility of making good faith
feminist arguments in favor of abortion regulations.
1 Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy, and Community, in ABORTION AND CATHOLICISM: THE
AMERICAN DEBATE 85 (Patricia Beattie Jung & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1988).
13 Brief of Feminists for Life of America, Women Exploited by Abortion of Greater
Kansas City, The National Association of Pro-Life Nurses, Let Me Live, and Elliot
Institute for Social Sciences Research, as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants 26,
William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605)
[hereinafter Brief of Feminists for Life of America].
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2. Arguments Opposing State Regulation of Abortion
Feminists who oppose state regulation of abortion frequently
base their arguments on notions of individual autonomy and pri-
vacy. Because these feminists fail to respond adequately to the
possibility of valuing prenatal life, their arguments are not in
good faith. Canadian Professor Judy Fudge's reaction to the opin-
ion of Justice Wilson in Morganteler, Smoling and Scott v. The
Queen illustrates the traditional pro-choice view.84 Fudge praises
her for echoing the "rhetoric of feminist appeals for reproductive
freedom as an element of personal autonomy" and criticizes her
for seriously considering the state's interest in protecting prenatal
life.85 As Kathleen McDonnell notes, the pro-choice perspective
assumes "that we are all, in some sense, atomized individuals
with competing rights, rather than beings whose very existence
is rooted in profound interconnections with each other. '86 Mc-
Donnell argues that we need to learn how to discuss the abortion
issue in a way that "lets in" the fetus. 87 Such a discussion would
be communitarian and less liberal.
It would be perfectly possible to develop a radical approach to
abortion that is more respectful of the value of prenatal life. We
could say that we do need to protect women's well-being and
prenatal life, but that at this time in our history, we cannot trust
the state when it tries to protect prenatal life. In other words,
the state is so disrespectful of women's well-being when it tries
to protect prenatal life by, for example, providing criminal sanc-
tions for abortion, that we cannot afford to give the state the
power to protect prenatal life. Only when the state develops a
consistent historical record of respecting women's well-being can
we delegate to the state the power to protect prenatal life. Thus,
we could be skeptical about the state's respect for women without
discounting the importance of valuing prenatal life.
- 44 D.L.R.4th 385 (1988). In Morganteler, the Canadian Supreme Court overturned
Canada's abortion statute which had criminalized abortion but made it possible for a
committee of physicians to approve therapeutic abortions. A divided Court in several
different opinions concluded that the approval process was too arbitrary to serve as the
method by which such an important decision was made.
81 Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction, supra note 5, at 541.
6 See McDONNELL, supra note 64, at 53.
87 Id.
1990]
Harvard Women's Law Journal
In Morganteler, Justice Wilson seemed to be struggling to
discover a communitarian way to discuss both a woman's right
to choose an abortion and the state's interest in protecting pre-
natal life, illustrating the possibility of a good faith feminist ar-
gument about abortion. Although Fudge accuses Wilson of "bal-
ancing" the woman's interest against the fetus' interest, that is
not necessarily what Wilson did. Wilson did not insist upon any
restrictions on a woman's ability to have an abortion. She only
suggested that at the point that a fetus becomes viable the state
may properly'take steps to preserve the fetus' life. It is conceiv-
able that these steps could both protect the woman's ability to
have an abortion and the state's interest in preserving fetal life.
For example, the state could insist that doctors take all reason-
able steps to preserve fetal life during a post-viability abortion.
An abortion is only a method to remove the fetus from the
woman's body. It does not, by definition, have to result in the
death of the fetus. Whether the fetus will also die depends, in
part, upon the steps that are taken by medical science to preserve
the fetus' life.
One inaccurate assumption that seems to be a part of Fudge's
argument is that a woman who has the right to choose an abortion
also has the right to choose to terminate the life of the fetus. 8
Morally, however, these two issues can be disconnected. We can
think of a woman's right to have an abortion as deriving from
her right not to be pregnant rather than from her right to terminate
the life of the fetus. It may be the case that the termination of
the fetus' life is a necessary consequence of her decision not to
continue with the pregnancy. However, she does not have the
moral right to insist upon the termination of the fetus' life when
she decides not to continue with her pregnancy.
Justice Wilson may have been trying to separate these two
issues. She protected a woman's ability to choose an abortion
but did not necessarily protect a woman's right to choose to have
the life of the fetus terminated. It is Fudge, not Wilson, who
considers the abortion issue necessarily to involve a balance
between a woman's right to choose an abortion and the state's
interest in preserving fetal life. By utilizing a more communitarian
8s See Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 18, at 1057.
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framework, we might consider the ways in which the state could
protect both the woman's well-being and the interest in preserv-
ing prenatal life, rather than incorrectly assume that the woman's
choice of an abortion has no effect on society or others.
In sum, many feminists are not willing to be open to the im-
portance of valuing prenatal life when they summarily dismiss
pro-life arguments. I think the abortion controversy would more
often be characterized by good faith disagreement if feminists
paused to consider the seriousness of the pro-life position. In
addition, consistent with Fudge's perspective on the co-optation
of radical arguments by liberal approaches, I think that feminists
would be less likely to have their perspectives distorted by the
judiciary when they make legal arguments if they become more
vigilant about what is a truly feminist perspective on an issue
like abortion. Feminist abortion arguments should be pro-woman,
viewing women as interconnected members of society, rather
than pro-choice, viewing each woman as an atomized individual
in society.
Religious feminists and socialist feminists sometimes make pro-
choice abortion arguments that are respectful of both women's
well-being and prenatal life. These arguments are usually sensi-
tive to the historical circumstances affecting women's condition
in society rather than being unqualified arguments about a wom-
an's right to have an abortion. For example, Christine Gudorf, a
religious feminist, makes an argument against state regulation of
abortion that respects the value of prenatal life but also recog-
nizes that it is disrespectful to women to place all the burdens of
valuing life, from conception to adulthood, on women.8 9 She
observes that the Catholic Church is usually more sensitive to
historical circumstances when making moral arguments than it
has been with respect to abortion. Gudorf suggests that as the
Church can generally favor peace yet recognize the necessity of
war in the appropriate historical circumstances, it might also
generally favor the preservation of prenatal life yet recognize the
necessity of abortion in present historical circumstances. Simi-
larly, some Buddhist-feminists argue that women should be al-
69 Christine E. Gudorf, To Make a Seamless Garment, Use a Single Piece of Cloth, in
ABORTION AND CATHOLICISM: THE AMERICAN DEBATE 279 (Patricia Beattie Jung &
Thomas A. Shannon eds. 1988).
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lowed to have abortions but that they should engage in a grieving
ritual to mourn the death of the prenatal life.90 Their view is
sympathetic to both women and prenatal life. Finally, Alison
Jaggar, a socialist feminist, argues that the feminist position
against state regulation of abortion is contingent upon our con-
temporary social-historical circumstances in which society places
all of the burden of bearing and raising children on women. 9'
Feminists can and do make good faith arguments concerning
abortion. Feminists can be respectful of women's well-being and
the value of prenatal life in discussing the abortion issue. The
challenge is to translate this perspective into legal argumentation.
As I have suggested, feminists can retain an openness to others
while making a legal argument that substantively represents their
position. In the next section I examine some of the briefs in
Webster to see how this aim might better have been achieved.
IV. WEBSTER: WHERE'S THE GOOD FAITH FEMINIST
LEGAL ARGUMENT?
Although a great number of briefs were filed in support of both
the Appellants and the Appellees in Webster, very few adequately
discussed the impact of abortion and abortion regulations on
women's well-being, and almost none of them discussed why we
should value prenatal life. The numerous briefs filed on behalf of
various feminist organizations were no exception. As I have pro-
posed above, discussion of these issues is essential to construct-
ing good faith feminist arguments on the abortion issue. These
briefs can instruct us, as feminists, as to how we should construct
constitutional arguments in future cases. Although I do not agree
with Professor Fudge that constitutional argumentation necessar-
ily co-opts feminist arguments into liberal arguments, I think
there is good evidence of that happening in the abortion
controversy.
90 See Buddhist Views on Abortion, 6 SPRING WIND-BUDDHIST CULTURAL FORUM
166 (1986).
9, Alison Jaggar, Abortion and a Woman's Right to Decide, 5 PHIL. F. 347 (1974).
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While Webster involved several constitutional issues,92 I will
focus on only one-the question of whether Roe v. Wade should
be overturned. In Roe, the Supreme Court concluded that abor-
tion regulations violated a woman's liberty or privacy interest in
being able to choose to have an abortion in consultation with her
physician. 93 In the first two trimesters of pregnancy, the Court
concluded, a state could not regulate abortions to protect prenatal
life. 94 The state's interest in protecting prenatal life became com-
pelling only in the third trimester, after viability. Even at that
point, the Court ruled, a state could not protect prenatal life if
doing so harmed the pregnant woman's life or health.95
The Appellants in Webster argued that Roe should be over-
turned. As a matter of constitutional law, they needed to dem-
onstrate that abortion regulations do not infringe a woman's lib-
erty or privacy interest and that even if they do infringe that
interest, the state has an overriding compelling interest in pre-
serving prenatal life. The Appellees argued that Roe should be
retained. They, therefore, needed to demonstrate that abortion
regulations infringe women's liberty or privacy interests and that
the state's interest in preserving prenatal life does not override
those interests.
Those arguments could have been made in good faith. Under
the test I have proposed, the Appellants could have argued that
although abortion regulations restrict women's liberty interest,
they are necessary because of the deep value we must give to
protecting life. Similarly, the Appellees could have argued that
despite the importance of valuing life, restricting abortions does
not achieve that result. Let us examine the briefs96 to see if the
92 See supra note 15.
93 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162 ("[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.").
94 Id. at 163 ("This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior
to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free
to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's
pregnancy should be terminated.").
9- Id. at 163-64 ("If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.").
96 In this Article I will limit my discussion to the chief briefs on both sides, as well as
those that represent both the typical "pro-life" and the typical "feminist" views. I will
also discuss those briefs that, although not specifically tailored as "feminist," did include
a substantive discussion of women's well-being.
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arguments were made in good faith. In addition, let us consider
whether the style of constitutional argumentation co-opted the
'substantive concerns of each side.
A. Appellants' Briefs
1. Protecting Women's Well-Being
To engage in a good faith argumentation, the Appellants needed
to show that women's well-being would be protected if states
were allowed to regulate abortion. Nevertheless, this issue was
not discussed at all by the Appellants or the former Solicitor
General. 97 Because the former Solicitor General and the Appel-
lants did not even recognize the necessity of discussing women's
well-being in the context of abortion restrictions, I conclude that
the chief briefs for the Appellants did not reflect an attempt to
engage in good faith argumentation.
In contrast, the brief filed by Feminists for Life of America9 8
on behalf of the Appellants did consider women's well-being.
Moreover, this brief was feminist in its structure in that it con-
tained the personal stories of many individual women. To dem-
onstrate the potential negative consequences of abortion, Femi-
nists for Life provided extensive testimony from women who had
abortions. For example, they illustrated that many black women
die during legal abortions that are performed by white men, but
that these deaths are not reported or are covered up.99 They
9 Moreover, the former Solicitor General also failed to address the impact of abortion
on women's lives. This is interesting given that the Government asked the Surgeon
General to conduct an evaluation of the impact of abortions on women's health. The
Surgeon General's study concluded that there was no evidence demonstrating that abor-
tions have adverse health consequences on women. The Report stated: "Valid scientific
studies have documented that, after abortion, physical health sequelae (including infer-
tility, incompetent cervix, miscarriage, premature birth, and low birth weight) are no
more frequent among women who experienced abortion than they are among the general
population of women." Surgeon General's Report on Abortion, 135 CONG. REC. E33,908
(Daily ed. March 21, 1989). As to the effects of abortions on women's psychological
health, the Report stated: "Although numerous case histories attest to immediate or
delayed psychological problems following abortions, the actual numbers of women who
have suffered in this way is unknown." Id. Rather than respond to this evidence respon-
sibly, the Appellants and former Solicitor General ignored it entirely.
91 Brief of Feminists for Life of America, supra note 83.
99 Id. at 17-18.
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further tried to portray abortion as detrimental to the well-being
of black women by providing quotations that illustrated the racist
motives of early advocates of contraception and abortion.10°
Feminists For Life agreed that it is important to protect wom-
en's well-being in relation to reproductive activity. However, they
disagreed with pro-choice feminists as to what form that protec-
tion should take. They seemed to believe that women naturally
want to protect fetal life and not have abortions and that it is
only through the coercive and racist forces of our society that
abortion becomes necessary. They favored regulations of abor-
tion that would provide women with more accurate knowledge
of the consequences of having an abortion and the possible results
of bearing an unwanted child. Because Roe v. Wade arguably
does not permit such regulations, especially when they would
occur during the first trimester, these feminists therefore felt
compelled to argue that Roe should be overturned to permit
increased regulation of abortion. They seemed confident that the
problem of abortion will largely disappear if women are more
fully informed about reproductive matters.
From a feminist perspective this argument is problematic be-
cause it represents gross stereotypes about women and is disres-
pectful to a woman's ability to assess her personal situation. The
brief seems to assume that all women would choose to bring their
pregnancies to term if their consciousnesses were raised. How-
ever, one integral aspect of consciousness-raising is the recogni-
tion that not all women need to respond to a life situation in the
same way. 1°1 Consciousness-raising tries to move women away
from a monolithic, programmed patriarchal response to one that
better reflects consideration of their own well-being. In fact,
consciousness-raising that results in women having a uniform
view of society has been criticized. 10 2 Some women who have
100 Id. at 18-19 n.35.
1 See, e.g., Introduction, in WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS, WOMEN'S CONSCIENCE: A
READER IN FEMINIST ETHICS xv (Barbara H. Andolsen, Christine E. Gudorf & Mary D.
Pellauer eds. 1985) ("However, listening to one another's stories, we also confront our
differences sharply and often uncomfortably .... One of the more serious challenges
facing feminist ethics is to maintain genuinely open and fair dialogue about women's
experiences.").
102 See Anne Bottomley, Susie Gibson & Belinda Meteyard, Dworkin; Which Dworkin?
Taking Feminism Seriously, 14 J.L. & Soc'Y 47, 56 (1987) (criticizing some uses of
consciousness-raising).
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had abortions may regret, in hindsight, that social circumstances
forced them to make that decision. However, it is hardly feminist
to let those individual stories speak for all women. Thus, although
Feminists for Life did attempt to consider the impact of abortion
regulations on women's well-being, on close examination their
consideration of women's well-being seems inconsistent with
some major tenets of feminist theory.
2. Preserving Prenatal Life
The second task for the Appellants' briefs was to show that
the courts have compelling reasons to provide legislatures with
more room to protect prenatal life by regulating abortion. Sur-
prisingly, the briefs contained virtually no argument for why we
should value prenatal life more than we do.
The brief by the former Solicitor General does not explain why
protecting prenatal life should be considered an important or
compelling state interest.103 The former Solicitor General argued
that the state's asserted interest in protecting prenatal life is not
necessarily qualitatively different at different periods of preg-
nancy. 104 Even if it is, he asserted, the interest may still be
sufficiently strong at all stages of pregnancy to constitute a com-
pelling state interest. Interestingly, he argued in the negative; he
did not offer any affirmative reasons to regard the interest as
compelling. He said:
But even if there is a core of common sense in the notion
that a State's legitimate interest in prenatal life 'grows in
substantiality' along with the development of the fetus, it
does not follow that this interest should not be regarded as
compelling throughout pregnancy. An interest may be suf-
ficiently weighty to be compelling in the constitutional sense
even if subsequently it takes on even greater urgency. 05
The Solicitor General merely offered historical evidence to justify
why states have a compelling interest in protecting prenatal life.
103 Brief for the United States, supra note 29.
1
4 Id. at 15.
"os Id.
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He noted that state anti-abortion laws in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury were directed at "what was widely viewed as a moral evil
comprehending the destruction of actual or nascent human
life.' 10 6 This historical argument, however, does not support the
compelling interest argument. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Cro-
son, the former Solicitor General himself asserted that the com-
pelling interest test must focus on* contemporary circumstances
rather than historical circumstances. 107 It was inconsistent for the
Solicitor General to argue for a different test based on historical
circumstances in Webster.108 Moreover, the argument fails to
explain why the states have valued prenatal life.
Similarly, the brief on behalf of Feminists for Life of America
failed to explain why we should value prenatal life. It simply
argued that because some women will come to value prenatal life
more after an abortion, we should let the states decide how to
protect women's emotional health by regulating abortion.
Finally, the brief on behalf of the National Right to Life Com-
mittee was also silent about why we should value prenatal life.109
The Committee simply relied on an unelaborated, historical state
interest argument similar to that employed by the former Solicitor
General to support overturning Roe."0 It did not try to justify
protecting prenatal life as a compelling state interest. Instead,
after arguing that a rational basis test should be used to assess
abortion restrictions, it summarily concluded that the statute
should be affirmed because "[g]iven the states' historic interest
in preserving life from the time of conception (an interest firmly
rooted in the history and conscience of our nation), there is
06 d. at 16.
107 In Croson, the Supreme Court insisted that the City of Richmond produce contem-
porary evidence of discrimination against blacks in the construction industry to justify
the city's minority set-aside program. It was not willing to rely upon a "generalized
assertion" to meet the compelling interest test. Id. at 723. It is inconsistent for the Solicitor
General to argue generally in Webster that a state needs to restrict women's liberty
interests through abortion regulations to protect prenatal life but then reject such gener-
alized assertions about blacks' experience in the construction industry in Croson.
103 See The Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 20, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) for an excellent comparison of the United
States' position on what is a compelling interest in Croson and in Webster.
,09 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Right to Life Committee, Inc. in Support
of Appellants, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989) (No. 88-605).
110 Id. at 20.
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clearly a rational basis to uphold the Missouri statutes at issue
herein." '' This final sentence of the brief is its only reference to
the importance of valuing life.
This discussion of the Appellants' briefs suggests that their
legal posturing distorted their substantive arguments. They
seemed to lose sight of why they wanted to regulate abortion and
seemed largely unable to respond to arguments about how abor-
tion regulations affect women's well-being. The only exception
to this pattern is the discussion of women's well-being in the brief
filed by Feminists for Life. At least a portion of that brief suggests
that there are people who are trying to justify state regulation of
abortion in feminist language. Feminists who oppose abortion
regulations might learn from the communitarian manner in which
this group tries to frame its argument. Its conclusion may be
wrong, but the structure of its argument may be correct.
B. Appellees' Briefs
1. Protecting Women's Well-Being
To engage in good faith argumentation the Appellees needed
to demonstrate that women's well-being would be harmed if
states were allowed to regulate abortion. However, many of the
briefs submitted in support of the Appellees did not sufficiently
describe how women's well-being would be affected by abortion
restrictions.
The brief fied by the National Organization for Women (NOW)
relied almost entirely on a privacy argument in urging the court
not to overturn Roe.12 In so doing, NOW failed to make the best
available feminist arguments concerning women's well-being. In-
stead of relying on an atomistic privacy argument, NOW could
have made a more group-based, equality argument under the
fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection clause. Such an argu-
" Id. at 26.
112 Brief for the National Organization for Women as Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellees, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No.
88-605) [hereinafter Brief for NOW].
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ment would permit us to discuss how abortion regulations are
disrespectful of the well-being of women as a class.
113
The NOW brief did seem to recognize the need to make an
argument based upon a consideration of women's well-being.
While the brief discussed the effects of both unwanted
pregnancy" 4 and abortion regulations 15 on women's lives, it
failed to translate that discussion into effective legal argument.
Rather than use the fourteenth amendment for this purpose, the
brief relied on the thirteenth amendment. It stated, "Requiring
women to surrender control of their bodies to the state during
pregnancy is in a very real sense a form of involuntary servitude
and thus is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the thirteenth
amendment."' 1 6 This argument was brief and unconvincing. It is
difficult to establish the applicability of the thirteenth amendment
in the context of abortion because the state is not necessarily
trying to enslave a woman during her pregnancy when it restricts
abortion; it is trying to punish her for choosing an abortion after
the pregnancy has occurred. Such punishment places an inequit-
able burden upon women in our society since we take no steps
to encourage men to avoid unwanted pregnancies, and could
therefore better be described as a fourteenth amendment viola-
tion. Moreover, by putting the argument in thirteenth amendment
terms, NOW added the confusing issue of the meaning of enslave-
ment and risked being disrespectful to the Black experience of
slavery. In sum, by failing to make an equal protection argument,
the NOW brief did not accurately discuss the implications of
abortion regulations on women's well-being.
In contrast, groups representing women of color, juvenile
women, and international women's health organizations fied
briefs in Webster that discussed women's well-being more di-
rectly." 7 Unlike the briefs discussed above, these briefs starkly
113 Elsewhere, I have discussed this approach as an "equality as compassion" or "equal-
ity as respect" approach. See Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, supra note 18.
114 Brief for NOW, supra note 112, at 10.
115 Id. at 15.
116 Id. at 13.
117 See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Council of Negro Women, Inc.; National
Urban League, Inc.; The American Indian Health Care Association; The Asian American
Legal Defense Fund; Committee for Hispanic Children and Families; The Mexican Amer-
ican Legal Defense and Education Fund; The National Black Women's Health Project;
National Institute for Women of Color; National Women's Health Network; Organizacion
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portrayed the impact that Roe's reversal would have on poor
women and juveniles. They did not discuss the abortion issue
entirely as a privacy issue; they discussed it as an issue jeopar-
dizing the well-being, and very lives, of women.
The brief filed by the National Council of Negro Women and
other organizations representing women of color argued that
when abortion was illegal, women of color were disproportion-
ately represented among those who died or were left sterile by
abortion. For example, in New York in 1965 before abortion
became legal, there were four abortion deaths for every 100,000
live births for white women, fifty-six abortion deaths for every
100,000 live births for non-white women, and sixty-one abortion
deaths for every 100,000 live births for Puerto Rican women."'
The legalization of abortion, on the other hand, has helped save
the lives of women of color, they argued. After New York legal-
ized abortion, the annual rate of abortion-related deaths fell by
fifty-one percent. 19 Additionally, the brief made clear that it is
not enough to make abortion legal if we want to protect the well-
being of poor women of color. Even with legalized abortion,
women of color continue to seek illegal abortions because they
cannot afford legal abortions. 20 Any increase in the cost of abor-
tion, they argued, forces some poor women to choose illegal
abortions which are not performed by licensed health care prac-
titioners.. From these facts, they concluded:
Nacional de la Salud de la Mujer Latina; Organization of Asian Women; Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund; Women of Color Partnership Program of the Religious
Coalition for Abortion Rights; Women of All Red Nations, North Dakota; YWCA of the
U.S.A., and Other Organizations in Support of Appellees, William L. Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief of the
National Council of Negro Women]; Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees by
Center for Population Options, The Society for Adolescent Medicine, The Juvenile Law
Center, and the Judicial Consent for Minors Referral Panel, William L. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief of
the Center for Population Options]; Brief of Amici Curiae International Women's Health
Organizations in Support of Appellees, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief for International Women's
Health Organizations]; Brief of Amici Curiae American Public Health Association, et al.
in Support of Appellees William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Brief of American Public Health Association]. See
also Brief of Canadian Women's Organizations, supra note 5 (discussing abortion issue
in terms of the right of a woman to control her reproductive capacity to live as full and
equal participant in society).
118 Brief of National Council of Negro Women, supra note 117, at 17-18.
119 Id. at 20-21.
120 Between 1975 and 1979, for example, 82% of the women who died after illegal
abortions were black and Latina. Id. at 21.
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This [sic] data, and data on health complications from illegal
abortions among the poor, even after legalization, suggest
that access to abortion must be very broad to ensure against
unconscionable discrimination. Any dilution of Roe v. Wade
spells a return to an era when women seeking abortions had
to risk their lives in order to obtain one.
121
One important theme in the brief by women of color is that the
well-being of women depends on the cost of abortion, not simply
the legality of abortion. They argued that abortion is already too
expensive for poor women to be able to protect the health of
themselves and their children. Even without the reversal of Roe,
poor women's lives are already endangered when they need an
abortion. Every incremental increase in the cost of abortion, such
as that caused by the imposition of hospitalization requirements,
means fewer abortions for poor women or delayed abortions at
significant health risk to poor women. The brief stated that Med-
icaid-eligible women had abortions two to three weeks later than
other women; nearly half of them reported that financial reasons
caused their delay. This delay caused twenty-two percent of Med-
icaid-eligible women in 1982 to have second-trimester rather than
first-trimester abortions, increasing substantially the health care
risks and costs of having an abortion. 122
The argument made by women of color was deeply feminist
because it asked the court to protect all women, not just middle-
class, adult, white women. The Roe privacy argument easily
allowed the result in Harris v. McRae to occur because it was
embedded in an individualistic rather than a communitarian
framework. The brief filed by the National Council of Negro
Women showed that we need to make abortion arguments in
equality terms, both in order to retain Roe and to overturn Harris.
Nevertheless, although the authors incorporated good faith ele-
ments in their brief, they devoted little space to translating into
legal argument their observations about the impact of reversing
Roe on the well-being of women of color. They never directly
told the Court that it would need not only to uphold Roe but to
reverse Harris v. McRae to accept the full implications of their
argument. Perhaps they were reluctant to make such an argument
121 Id. at 22.
'2 Id. at 50-51.
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to a Court which seems to be hostile to radical, class, or race-
based arguments. However, they might have written a more ef-
fective brief had they translated their argument more directly into
equal protection terms. The briefs of the Appellants attacked the
privacy justification for Roe as unprincipled. By offering a cogent
equal protection perspective, the women of color could have
provided the Court's progressive members with an opportunity
to begin to reweave our abortion legal argumentation using more
radical and communitarian language, even if the first step had to
occur in a dissenting opinion. As the dissent in Homer Plessy v.
John Ferguson'12 served as the foundation for Oliver Brown v.
Board of Education,124 the dissent in Webster could have served
as the foundation for the overturning of Harris v. McRae at a
future time.
The brief representing juvenile women likewise made powerful
arguments about the implications of reversing Roe for the well-
being of juvenile women. The brief observed that before abortions
were legal and relatively accessible to juveniles, a large propor-
tion of teenage girls who committed or attempted to commit
suicide thought they were, or actually were, pregnant.2 5 For
teenagers who do carry a fetus to term, the mortality rates from
continued pregnancy and childbearing are much higher than for
women aged twenty to twenty-four.
2 6
However, the brief on behalf of juveniles also failed to translate
its substantive observations into an equal protection framework;
instead, the brief relied entirely on the right to choose as a liberty
interest. 27 As I have argued above, when we use individualistic
liberty arguments, we do not fully protect the interests of poor
women and women of color. To borrow a term from Mari Mat-
suda, we can learn a lot about good constitutional argumentation
by "looking to the bottom.' ' 28 The evidence from "the bottom"-
women of color, poor women, and teenagers-is that abortion
regulations harm the well-being of both women and their children;
our legal arguments need to reflect that fact.
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
124 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
125 Brief by Center for Population Options, supra note 117, at 9.
126 Id. at 7.
"2 Id. at 13-23.
128 Matsuda, supra note 47.
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2. Preserving Prenatal Life
The second task for the Appellees in making a good faith
argument would be to demonstrate that allowing state legislatures
to regulate abortion would not serve a state interest in preserving
prenatal life. However, in making this argument, none of the
briefs submitted in support of Appellees acknowledged that it is
important to value prenatal life.
The NOW privacy perspective failed to recognize women's
responsibilities to others and the possibility of valuing prenatal
life. It rejected arguments about women's responsibilities to so-
ciety, stating:
There is no authority for the proposition that the state can
compel an individual to give up the right to control his or
her body to benefit another. The idea, for example, that the
state could determine that a supposedly less worthy member
of society must donate an organ to save the life of a pillar
of the community is unthinkable. So too, is it far beyond
the pale to suggest that a parent be ordered to undergo
surgery and months of life-threatening activity in order to
benefit a child.129
This argument begs the question of why it is unthinkable for the
state to compel a person to donate an organ in order to save the
life of another, especially when that person is a relative. Patricia
Beattie Jung, a religious feminist, agrees that the state should not
compel organ donation, yet offers a more communitarian per-
spective on that issue than does the NOW brief. Jung suggests
that we should live in a society in which people are socialized to
want to donate organs to sustain the life of another person.
However, she rejects the idea that such values should be com-
pelled. 30 Thus, one can reject the coercive features of abortion
restrictions without also denying the importance of the values of
donation.
129 Brief for NOW, supra note 112, at 10-12.
130 Patricia Beattie Jung, Abortion and Organ Donation: Christian Reflections on Bodily
Life Support, in ABORTION & CATHOLICISM 141. See also Colker, Abortion andDialogue,
supra note 26, at 1397 n.74.
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The Brief by Catholics for a Free Choice also fails the good
faith disagreement test by failing to address the issue of the value
of prenatal life. It refuses to acknowledge that we may want to
live in a world in which we have interconnected responsibilities
to each other. It deals with the responsibility issue briefly in a
footnote:
Constitutional concerns of privacy protect bodily integrity
of persons and do not require exceptional samaritanism. A
parent cannot be compelled to save the life of a born child
by organ donation, transfusion or other invasive practice;
nor could a fetus compel anyone (including the biological
"father" of the fetus) to provide a blood transfusion in utero
or after birth. There is no question that the individual's rights
of privacy and physical integrity would prevail over the
child's or the fetus' claim for assistance.1
31
The brief fails adequately to address the possibility that a woman
might have a responsibility to her fetus. Instead, it summarily
concludes that nearly all women do consider interests of other
persons in making an abortion decision: "A pregnant woman in
the exercise of her conscience takes into account the many fac-
tors relevant to the decision, which may include the consideration
of the needs and relations of persons (including the pregnant
woman herself and her already born children). '3
The Brief for the Appellees also relied entirely on a privacy
argument. However, as an improvement over the two briefs dis-
cussed above, it did try to define the privacy right in an nonatom-
istic way. The Appellees said:
The Solicitor General's most serious error is his argument
that a fundamental right to abortion does not flow logically
out of the general right to privacy or personal autonomy
which protects matters of procreation and family life, in-
cluding contraception, because the woman is not "isolated
in her privacy" in making the abortion decision ....
This line of argument misconceives the nature of the "pri-
vacy" right . . . .That right is in no way dependent on
"I Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice, supra note 42, at 31 n.6.
"' Id. at 32.
[Vol. 13
Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?
whether an individual is "isolated" in his or her privacy
S. .. Such decisions are best left to the individual rather
than the state, not because of some abstract value in solitary
decisionmaking, but because of the profound effect such
decisions have on an individual's destiny ....
Indeed, if this Court adopts the Solicitor General's pro-
posed analysis of fundamental rights, according to which the
countervailing state interests undercut the nature of the right
itself rather than guiding the extent to which it can be
abridged, it will have set itself on a course which reaches
far beyond the narrow issue of proscription of abortion. 133
Thus, this brief tried to salvage privacy theory by making it
appear less atomistic. However, this argument fails to. address
how the abortion decision may have a profound effect on others.
The Appellees did not allow for the possibility that a pregnant
woman may have obligations to others, including the fetus. Their
brief cited with approval cases in which pregnant women were
found not liable for tortious prenatal injuries134 and criticized
cases in which courts tried to compel women to modify their
behavior to protect fetal well-being.
135 Substantively, the Appel-
lees may be correct that states act unconstitutionally when they
attempt to control women's behavior during pregnancy. How-
ever, I do not see how we can be convinced of that fact, as
feminists, without being offered a communitarian, woman-cen-
tered perspective that considers a woman's responsibility to her
fetus in a nonatomistic way. We would need to "let in" the fetus
to achieve that argument. Thus, I do not find this attempt to
salvage.privacy theory effective. 136
"3 Brief for Appellees, supra note 25, at 9-10.
11
4 Id. at 12.
I's Id. at 12 n.22.
136 The failure of the Appellees to create a convincingly feminist (i.e., group-based and
communitarian) privacy theory raises the question of whether liberal constitutional ar-
guments can ever be feminist. Carl Wellman suggests that the language of rights can be
communitarian. He says:
The language of rights does presuppose some sort of individualism, for every
right is possessed by some individual right-holder. But these individuals need not
be social atoms-self-contained, independent and isolated persons. Indeed, for
reasons we have already explained, any individual capable of possessing moral
rights cannot be a social atom. This is because there are three roles implicit in the
very concept of a right-that of the first party who holds the right, the second
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In contrast to the briefs discussed above, the brief filed on
behalf of women of color "let in" the fetus by not portraying the
abortion issue as a contest between women and prenatal life. It
noted that illegal abortions cause women of color to become
sterilized in disproportionate numbers. 37 The brief on behalf of
juvenile women focused on protecting prenatal life more directly.
It observed that teenage girls are approximately half as likely to
receive prenatal care as other pregnant women and that children
of teenage mothers are twice as likely to die in infancy than those
born to women in their twenties. 
138
The Brief by International Women's Health Organizations 13 9
related the issue of maternal health to fetal well-being even more
directly. The authors noted 'that the United States ranks nine-
teenth worldwide in infant mortality, a statistic that is largely
attributable to high infant mortality rates among poor women.
They stated, "It has been established that the increase in the legal
abortion rate is the single most important factor in reductions in
both white and nonwhite neonatal mortality rates. 1 40 In addition,
they noted that other countries take a more communitarian ap-
proach to the abortion issue by recognizing how a woman's preg-
nancy can affect the well-being of other family members. Many
western countries, such as Britain, permit lawful abortion when
continuation of a woman's pregnancy involves risk of injury to
the physical or mental health of any existing children in her
party against whom the right holds, and the third party who might intervene in
any confrontation between the right-holder and the second party. Far from assum-
ing the existence of atomic individuals, the assertion of any right presupposes a
social nexus in which individuals interact and stand in essentially social relations.
Carl Wellman, Doing Justice to Rights, 3 HYPATIA 153, 154-55 (1989).
Although Wellman is wrong to assume that there is necessarily a third party in rights
disputes, it is helpful to realize that rights claims are always made oppositionally to
another, necessarily raising the question of individuals' relations to each other. A failure
to make a rights claim may leave an individual isolated and unprotected; making a rights
claim, however, can produce a relationship of responsibility between individuals. This
leaves open the possibility that a nonatomistic privacy argument exists; however, a truly
convincing one has not yet been made. In a previous work, I have tried to articulate a
group-based privacy theory. See Ruth Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Towards the
Development of a Group-Based Theory for Sex-Based Intrusions of Privacy, I LAW &
INEQUALITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY & PRACTICE 191 (1983).
137 Brief of the National Council of Negro Women, supra note 117, at 15-16.
118 Brief of the Center for Population Options, supra note 117, at 8.
139 Brief of International Women's Health Organizations, supra note 30.
140 Id. at 16.
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family.14 1 This approach protects a woman's right to have an
abortion without pretending that the woman is isolated in her
pregnancy.
Nevertheless, not one of these briefs sufficiently discussed the
state's interest in valuing life. No brief supporting the Appellees
had an entire section which acknowledged the importance of
valuing life but then showed how regulating abortion does not
achieve that value. We can make a much more powerful feminist
argument that is also more open to the state's interest in pro-
tecting prenatal life within existing constitutional discourse.
V. THE WEBSTER DECISION
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that neither the
Appellants nor the Appellees sufficiently demonstrated to the
Court how abortion regulations affect women's well-being. Nor
did either party sufficiently address the value of prenatal life.
Nevertheless, amicus briefs on behalf of the Appellees provided
the Court with evidence about the impact of abortion regulations
on the lives of women of color, poor women, and teenage girls
both in the United States and abroad. Although those briefs could
have done a better job of translating their concerns into consti-
tutional language, the documentary evidence was available, had
the Court been committed to protecting women's well-being.
An examination of the text of the Webster decision, however,
reveals virtually no understanding by the Court of the impact of
abortion regulations on women's lives. No member of the Su-
preme Court in Webster, including any of the dissenters, dem-
onstrated a real grasp of the probable impact of the Missouri
legislation on women's well-being. Nor did any Justice discuss
the fetal life issue adequately. Although the primary purpose of
this Article is to illustrate how lawyers could make good faith
arguments concerning abortion to the Court, I think it is useful
to look at the Court's response when some of those arguments
are raised, even if by amici.
"I Id. at 15 n.54.
1990]
Harvard Women's Law Journal
The question of whether to overrule Roe v. Wade was pre-
sented in the context of determining the constitutionality of a
requirement that a physician ascertain whether a fetus is viable
prior to performing an abortion on any woman who he or she has
reason to believe is twenty or more weeks pregnant. Under the
Roe framework, such restrictions were not permissible before the
third trimester. This provision contained technical and substan-
tive difficulties. Technically, the provision appeared to require
physicians to perform viability tests that were contrary to ac-
cepted medical practice, including, for example, performing am-
niocentesis on a fetus that was under twenty-eight weeks old. If
that had been the actual meaning of the statute, most of the
Justices would have been compelled to find it unconstitutional
even under the lenient rational basis standard of review because
the statute would have served no rational public purpose. To
avoid that conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a
plurality of the Court, offered a somewhat strained interpretation
of the statute so that a physician would have the discretion to
perform only tests that were medically appropriate.
14 2
Having overcome that technical hurdle, Rehnquist then turned
to the substantive question of whether a pre-third trimester re-
striction to protect potential life should be permitted although
such restrictions were not permitted under Roe. Rehnquist con-
cluded that the Roe trimester framework was too rigid; that if
the state has an interest in preserving potential human life after
viability, it also has an interest in preserving that potential life
before viability.143 Rehnquist did not consider the impact that
such regulations would have on women's well-being.
Justice Scalia, unlike Rehnquist, concluded that Roe should be
overturned and that states should be free to regulate or crimin-
alize abortion at any stage of pregnancy. 144 Clearly, as discussed
above, his view failed to consider the impact on women's well-
being of abortion regulations, including criminal regulations.
Finally, Justice O'Connor, although providing the fifth vote to
uphold the Missouri statute, did not argue that Roe needed to be
overturned or even modified to reach the conclusion that the
142 109 S. Ct. at 3055.
143 Id. at 3057.
144 Id. at 3064.
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viability provision was constitutional. O'Connor reinterpreted the
Court's prior decisions to require that states "not impose an
undue burden on a woman's abortion decision. '145 Because she
concluded that the viability tests could be performed without
markedly increasing the cost of abortion, O'Connor argued that
the undue burden test had been satisfied.
The discussion of women's well-being by the dissenters, al-
though an improvement over the plurality's discussion, was also
inadequate. Justice Blackmun said that he feared "for the liberty
and equality of the millions of women who have lived and come
of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided" and "for the
integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court. ' 146 Despite the
ammunition available from the briefs filed by women of color and
juvenile girls, Blackmun did not elaborate on those statements.
Rather, he spent most of his opinion explaining why there was
no good reason to change the course of the privacy doctrine
initially formulated in his opinion in Roe.
One of the most disappointing parts of Blackmun's opinion is
his conclusion that, if the majority's technical interpretation of
the second provision were correct, he "would see little or no
conflict with Roe." 147 In other words, he appeared to agree with
Justice O'Connor that such a provision would not constitute an
"undue burden" on a woman's abortion decision. Blackmun dis-
sented from the majority because he took issue with the technical
interpretation of the viability testing provision, not because he
fundamentally disagreed about the impact that the requirement
would have on women's lives and well-being.
If Justice Blackmun had truly considered the "liberty and
equality" interests of sixteen million women, he would not have
been so easily satisfied. As the briefs that were presented to the
court by women of color and teenage women dramatically illus-
trated, raising the cost of abortion, even marginally, has a marked
impact on the ability of poor women to obtain abortions. Fur-
thermore, because women of color and teenage women are more
likely to delay abortion decisions, they will be hit harder by the
viability testing requirement than other women. For poor women,
141 Id. at 3063--64.
46 Id. at 3067.
147 Id. at 3070.
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even the requirement that they pay for their own abortions is an
undue burden on their reproductive decision making. Raising the
cost of abortion presents an even greater burden. Thus, Justice
Blackmun did not fully consider the statute's implications on
women's well-being under his privacy framework.
The Webster decision is equally disappointing in its treatment
of the interest in protecting prenatal life. Justice Rehnquist's
plurality opinion failed to articulate why a state has a compelling,
or even a legitimate, interest in protecting prenatal life before
viability. Rejecting the viability standard, he said: "[W]e do not
see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that
there should be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability
but prohibiting it before viability."'1 48 This statement is phrased
in the negative and hardly counts as a justification under the
compelling interest standard. He also stated, "The Missouri test-
ing requirement here is reasonably designed to ensure that abor-
tions are not performed where the fetus is viable-an end which
all concede is legitimate-and that is sufficient to sustain its
constitutionality."'' 49 However, his statement does not explain
why the state should be allowed to regulate abortion before via-
bility or why regulation of abortion meets the compelling interest
standard.
Although Justice Blackmun's dissent did not "let in" the fetus,
he did recognize the weakness in the plurality's discussion of the
importance of protecting prenatal life. Blackmun stated: "The
opinion contains not one word of rationale for its view of the
State's interest. This 'it-is-so-because-we-say-so' jurisprudence
constitutes nothing other than an attempted exercise of brute
force; reason, much less persuasion, has no place."'' 50 Similarly,
he criticized the test purportedly used by the majority-whether
the regulation "permissibly furthers the State's interest in pro-
tecting potential human life"--as circular and totally meaningless
because the standard of whether a regulation "permissibly fur-
thers" the State's interest is itself the question before the Court.
148 Id. at 3057.
149 Id. at 3058.
Io Id. at 3075.
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It therefore could not be the standard that the Court applied in
resolving the question. 151
Thus, the Webster decision is disappointing in its discussion of
both key issues-protecting women's well-being and valuing pre-
natal life. Not only did the majority seem not to understand the
meaning of abortion regulations to women's lives, but even the
dissenters failed to display much understanding or sensitivity.
They seemed more determined to protect the integrity of their
prior decisions than to consider the reality of new abortion re-
strictions on women's lives. In addition, the opinion leaves us
with no lasting understanding of why protecting the value of
prenatal life is more important than protecting the reproductive
well-being of women. It does not reflect real dialogue within the
Court, nor does it provide a basis for real dialogue in society at
large.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both the briefs filed in Webster and the Court's opinions were
a major disappointment from a feminist perspective because they
did not reflect real dialogue or good faith argumentation on the
abortion issue. Although many feminist briefs were filed in Webs-
ter, few of them gave the Court a good grounding in how abortion
regulations dramatically affect the well-being of women. When
those arguments were made, they were often hidden behind a
privacy framework, a framework that is ill-equipped to focus on
women's well-being, instead of forcefully argued, as part of an
equal protection framework. Nor did any of the feminist briefs
demonstrate a deep commitment to protecting the value of pre-
natal life in society; none of them recognized that the destruction
of prenatal life to protect women's well-being is an unfortunate
rather than a welcome outcome.
The Supreme Court's decision in Webster was also a disap-
pointment. Not once did the plurality's opinions consider the
impact of their decisions on the lives and health of women. Not
151 Id. at 3076.
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once did the plurality opinions acknowledge the powerful argu-
ments made by women of color about the effects of abortion
regulations on their lives and health. The only "interest" the
plurality opinions purported to protect was the states' unjustified
interest in protecting prenatal life. The plurality's opinions were
so disconnected from considerations of women's well-being that
the reader could easily forget that fetuses are found in women,
not in an independent state. And, disappointingly, even the dis-
senters failed to discuss the issue fully from the perspective of
women's well-being.
The briefs by the various feminist organizations are not to
blame for the disrespectful picture of women's role in reproduc-
tion which characterizes the plurality's opinions in Webster. The
blame goes more directly to President Reagan who picked many
of the Justices precisely because they think of reproductive de-
cisions in a way that is disrespectful of women's well-being. The
fact that Reagan-conservatives do not understand that reproduc-
tion issues are profoundly women's issues, however, should not
lead us, as feminists, to forget how to talk about reproduction in
women-centered language.
By re-examining our pro-choice perspective, I believe we can
do better. We can find ways to argue against state regulation of
abortion from a communitarian, pro-woman perspective that has
not been corrupted by liberal individualism. State regulation of
abortion kills women and endangers women's health. A state has
no right to impose such a death sentence on women who face
unwanted and usually unintended pregnancies. We need to start
using constitutional discourse to make this point, to be a part of
the process of transforming our Constitution into a more radical
document.
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